

Talking Points on Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

The United States and our partners have concluded an historic deal that will peacefully and verifiably prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. This deal is the result of nearly 20 months of intensive negotiations since the P5+1 and Iran concluded the Joint Plan of Action.

This is a very good deal. It fulfills the framework for a comprehensive deal that was reached in Lausanne – and goes beyond that framework in several areas. It cuts off all of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear weapon. It ensures the vigorous inspections and transparency necessary to verify that Iran cannot pursue a nuclear weapon. It ensures that sanctions will snap back into place if Iran violates the deal. And it is a long-term deal, including elements that will be permanent.

The United States refused to take a bad deal – we held out for a deal that met every single one of our bottom lines, and we got it. The reason why these talks were extended so many times – and *why* we were willing to go beyond the July 9 reporting date to Congress – is because we were not going to accept anything less. This is also an incredibly detailed agreement – with a main text and detailed annexes. The deal will now submit to Congress for the 60-day review period – and the President will veto any action by Congress that would prevent the successful implementation of this deal.

Pathways

This deal cuts off Iran’s ability to pursue a nuclear weapon with plutonium.

- The core of Iran’s heavy water reactor at Arak will be removed and filled with concrete so it can never be used again. The United States will be part of the international partnership that will approve the plan to redesign and rebuild the reactor so that it will not produce weapons grade plutonium.
- For the next 15 years, Iran will not be able to build any additional heavy water reactors; will not be able to accumulate excess heavy water; and will not be able to conduct reprocessing.
- Iran will ship out all spent fuel for present and future power and research nuclear reactors for 15 years and has committed to rely on light water for future nuclear reactors.

This deal cuts off Iran’s ability to pursue a nuclear weapon through uranium enrichment.

- Iran will have to remove 2/3 of its centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium. All of the pipework that connects these centrifuges and allows them to enrich uranium will be dismantled, removed and kept under continuous surveillance by the IAEA.
- For a decade Iran will only be able to operate roughly 5,000 centrifuges at Natanz. Iran will not be able to enrich uranium or keep any fissile materials at Fordow for 15 years.
- For the first decade, Iran will only be allowed to use its first generation, IR-1 centrifuges for enrichment purposes. It will have to remove its 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage. There will also be strict limitations on research and development. For 10 years, Iran will not be able to produce enriched uranium with any its advanced centrifuges.

- Iran will have to reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium by 98 percent. To put that in perspective, Iran currently has enough raw materials to produce about 10 nuclear weapons. When reduced by 98 percent, Iran won't have enough enriched uranium for even a single nuclear weapon. This cap on Iran's stockpile will last for 15 years.
- With this deal, Iran's so-called "breakout timeline" – the amount of time it would take Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon if Iran breaks its commitments – will be extended from roughly the current 2-3 months, to at least one year during the first decade.
- Iran also has a separate "breakout timeline" of at least a year to build an actual warhead capable of delivering a nuclear payload. This deal goes beyond Lausanne in ensuring commitments against weaponization by Iran, which has committed to not engage in activities, including R&D, that could be related to development of a nuclear explosive device.

Inspections

This deal includes the most comprehensive and intrusive verification regime ever negotiated.

- There will be 24/7 monitoring of Iran's declared nuclear facilities, including Natanz, Fordow, and Arak.
- International inspectors will have access to Iran's entire nuclear supply chain – its uranium mines and mills; its conversion facility; its centrifuge manufacturing and storage facilities; and its other declared nuclear sites – critical elements which will be under watchful eye for 25 years. As a result, Iran would need to construct an entire covert supply chain to pursue a covert nuclear weapons program.
- A dedicated procurement channel will be established to monitor and approve, on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual-use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure to prevent diversion of sensitive goods to a covert program.
- Iran has agreed to provide the IAEA with the information necessary to address the possible military dimensions of Iran's past program – or PMD. Iran will not receive sanctions relief until the IAEA gets the cooperation it needs to complete its investigation into PMD. The IAEA will have the access to Parchin that the IAEA believes it needs.
- Going forward, Iran will implement the Additional Protocol, which ensures the IAEA can seek access to non-declared facilities or any suspicious site. Put simply, the IAEA will have access when it needs it, and where it needs it. If the IAEA has concerns, no site will be considered off limits in order to address them and this could include military sites.
- The JCPOA will also require that Iran grant the IAEA access to any requested locations within 24 days if a majority of our partners agree it is necessary. This means we can achieve the access IAEA inspectors need if the United States and our European allies are in agreement.

Sanctions

Iran will not receive any new sanctions relief until it verifiably completes important steps to rollback its program, and we can snap sanctions back into place if Iran violates the deal.

- Reports of a “signing bonus” were false – Iran must complete its key nuclear steps before it begins to receive sanctions relief beyond the limited relief provided for under the JPOA. We anticipate that it will take Iran from 6 months to a year to complete these key steps.
- The JCPOA allows us to snap sanctions back into place if Iran violates the deal.
- Since the President will be using his waiver authority to provide relief, the United States can quickly reimpose our unilateral sanctions if Iran cheats. Meanwhile, we will be keeping in place other unilateral sanctions that relate to non-nuclear issues such as support for terrorism and human rights abuses.
- The UN Security Council Resolutions that imposed sanctions on Iran will be replaced by a new UN Security Council Resolution that will last for a decade. For the first decade of the deal, there will be an automatic snapback of these multilateral sanctions if Iran violates the deal– a snapback that cannot be vetoed by Russia or China. In addition, for years 11-15, the P5+1 has agreed to re-impose sanctions if Iran violates the deal.
- This new UN Security Council resolution will re-establish important sanctions restricting the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies and keep in place sanctions on ballistic missiles for 8 years and conventional arms for 5 years.